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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that the belief that an emotion justifies one’s ideology increases 
one’s motivation to experience this emotion. However, a question that remains is whether 
such findings can be obtained using politically-relevant as well as irrelevant targets of 
emotion. The purpose of the present study is to answer this question for leftists and rightists, 
with hope and fear as the focal emotions. To this end, two experimental conditions are 
employed, with one containing politically-relevant article headlines and the other containing 
politically-irrelevant headlines. In each condition, headlines hinting at either hope- or fear-
inducing articles are shown, and participants’ rankings of these headlines are used as 
indications of their desire to experience hope or fear. Political ideology is found to influence 
the motivation to experience hope versus fear, although this effect is not mediated by the 
belief that these emotions justify one’s ideology. Furthermore, neither the political relevance 
of headlines nor the interaction of political relevance and ideology affect the desire to 
experience hope versus fear. However, controlling for the influence of gender on the 
motivation to experience hope versus fear causes the effect of ideology on this motivation to 
become nonsignificant. Results are discussed and compared to previous findings, potential 
limitations and future directions are suggested, and a conclusion is formulated.  
 Keywords: motivated emotion regulation, ideology, beliefs, hope, fear 
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 At times, people may have specific motives for regulating their emotions (e.g., Tamir, 
2016; Tamir & Ford, 2012). One such motive, recently examined by Pliskin, Nabet, Jost, 
Tamir, and Halperin (in preparation), is the justification of one’s political ideology. Pliskin 
and her colleagues found that leftists believed more strongly than rightists that hope justified 
their ideology and were thus more motivated to experience hope (and actually did), despite 
the presence of intractable intergroup conflict that might discourage experiencing this 
emotion. In contrast, rightists believed more strongly than leftists that fear justified their 
ideology and were thus more motivated to experience fear (and actually did) during the 
intergroup conflict.  
 A potential limitation of the study by Pliskin et al. (in preparation) is that its results 
were obtained using only politically-relevant targets of emotion. People may thus have been 
more likely to believe that emotions justified their ideologies simply because the emotions’ 
targets were politically-relevant (and therefore congruent with their ideologies). To what 
extent, then, does the congruence between an emotion’s target and one’s ideology affect the 
belief that the emotion justifies one’s ideology (and the resulting motivation to experience the 
emotion)? The present study is meant to answer this question regarding leftists and rightists, 
with hope and fear as the focal emotions. To provide a useful context in which to discuss the 
present study, relevant literature will be reviewed on ideology and motivated reasoning, on 
hope and fear as emotions, on motivated emotion regulation and ideology, and on incidental 
emotions. 
Ideology and Motivated Reasoning                                                                              
 Ideology may be defined as a set of beliefs or mental models, held by individuals or 
shared among group members, that helps to interpret the environment as it is while also 
specifying how the environment should be (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Within the 
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context of ideology, acceptance of inequality and openness to social change can serve as 
dimensions that distinguish between the political left and right, with the former characterised 
by low acceptance of inequality and high openness to social change and the latter 
characterised by high acceptance of inequality and low openness to social change (Jost et al., 
2009).  
 Furthermore, individuals may be more likely to adopt an ideology when it fulfils their 
dominant epistemic, existential or relational needs (Jost et al., 2009), and the fulfilment of 
these needs motivates them to maintain their ideologies (Jost & Amodio, 2012). The desire to 
maintain one’s ideology was also observed by Skitka and her colleagues, who found that 
while liberals initially attributed individuals’ problems to dispositional factors, they 
subsequently made a motivated correction in accordance with their (liberal) ideology by 
taking situational factors into account (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 
2002). The concept of motivated correction is related to research suggesting that people 
generally engage in a cognitively-biased search for information supporting their desired 
conclusions (rather than the most accurate ones; Kunda, 1990). Such motivated reasoning 
may also be an implicit means of emotion regulation, biasing information processing in 
favour of experiencing certain emotions (Westen, 1994; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann, 2006). In addition, Pliskin et al. (in preparation) have found that beliefs about the 
extent to which hope and fear justify one’s ideology can drive the regulation of these 
emotions. Because hope and fear also play an important role in the present study, these 
emotions will be discussed in more detail below. However, to facilitate an understanding of 
hope and fear as emotions, a brief description of emotions in general will be provided first. 
Hope and Fear as Emotions 
 Emotions are collections of conscious or unconscious processes related to cognitive 
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appraisal, motivation, and action readiness (Frijda, 2004). More specifically, emotions can be 
viewed as appraisals of one’s environment combined with associated changes in action 
readiness (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). They have also been found to influence 
attitudes, as well as the motivation to take action, regarding a public event (i.e., a peace 
summit; Halperin, 2011). Before moving on to a discussion of motivated emotion regulation 
and its link to ideology, it may be useful to consider different aspects of the two emotions 
central to the present study: hope and fear.  
 Hope and fear are emotions that respectively involve positive and negative views of 
possible change (Pliskin et al., in preparation), similar to how the political left and right 
respectively involve high and low openness to social change (Jost et al., 2009). Hope is an 
emotion that is highly cognitive in nature and involves positive feelings about a positive goal 
one expects to achieve (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014). It also promotes 
creativity and cognitive flexibility and thus facilitates finding or being open to solutions to an 
intergroup conflict (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). Accordingly, Cohen-Chen et al. (2014) found 
that, during an intergroup conflict, hope made leftists more receptive to information 
supporting peace. 
 In contrast to hope, fear is an emotion that may be experienced in response to 
perceptions of threat or danger to oneself or one’s ingroup (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). Fear 
consists of both psychological and physiological reactions aimed at survival, and it tends to 
involve appraisals of low strength and little control over a situation. Furthermore, this  
emotion can be triggered automatically and may sometimes dominate one’s thoughts (Cohen-
Chen et al., 2014). As fear causes people to selectively recall fear-related information, it also 
reduces their receptivity to new ideas. For example, people with more conservative, rightist 
ideologies have been found to perceive more threat and experience greater fear, biasing them 
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toward information that disfavours opportunities for peace during intergroup conflict (Cohen-
Chen et al., 2014). 
Motivated Emotion Regulation and Ideology 
 While leftists appear to have a greater tendency to experience hope and rightists a 
greater tendency to experience fear (in the context of intergroup conflict) their emotional 
reactions are not necessarily automatic; these may be intentionally regulated (Pliskin et al., in 
preparation). Emotion regulation refers to motivated processes distinct from the automatic 
generation of emotions (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). These processes affect the specific type of 
emotion one experiences, as well as the timing and expression of the emotion and how one 
experiences it (Gross, 2014). 
 Previous studies have distinguished between hedonic and instrumental motives for 
emotion regulation (Tamir, 2016; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Hedonic motives refer to 
the motivation to experience pleasant emotions and to avoid unpleasant ones, whereas 
instrumental motives refer to the desire to experience (pleasant or unpleasant) emotions that 
facilitate goal achievement. In addition, ideology has been found to drive emotion regulation 
during intractable intergroup conflict, with leftist ideology leading to increased intergroup 
empathy and rightist ideology leading to increased intergroup anger (Porat, Halperin, & 
Tamir, 2016).  
 As discussed earlier, Pliskin et al. (in preparation) have shown that the belief that an 
emotion justifies one’s ideology motivates one to experience this emotion. However, they 
exclusively studied emotions with politically-relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) targets. Thus, 
people may have believed that emotions justified their ideologies simply because the 
emotions’ targets were congruent with their ideologies (i.e., politically-relevant). 
Investigating this possibility is important as it may clarify whether the results obtained by 
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Pliskin and her colleagues also apply to emotions with politically-irrelevant targets. The 
present study therefore examines people’s beliefs about emotions with politically-relevant 
versus irrelevant targets. The use of emotions with politically-irrelevant targets is based on 
the concept of incidental emotions (e.g., Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). 
Incidental Emotions 
 Previous studies have made a distinction between integral and incidental emotions 
(e.g., Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2017). Whereas integral emotions stem from the decision at 
hand, incidental emotions carry over from prior situations to affect decisions to which they 
were initially unrelated (Lerner et al., 2015). For example, anger aroused in one situation can 
subsequently elicit a desire to blame people who are unrelated to the source of the anger 
(Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). In addition, Kausel and Connolly (2014) have shown that beliefs 
about incidental emotions can influence behaviour. They found that in a Trust Game, players 
A sent less money to angry (compared to guilty or neutral) players B because they believed 
that incidental anger made players B less trustworthy.  
 Just as incidental emotions can influence decisions to which they were initially 
unrelated (Lerner et al., 2015), hope and fear with politically-irrelevant targets may be 
considered in relation to ideology (thereby transcending their original context) and thus be 
perceived as ideologically-relevant. This may be especially likely when a desire to experience 
ideology-justifying emotions (which is induced experimentally in the present study) 
encourages people to consider various emotions in relation to their ideologies. When hope 
and fear with politically-irrelevant targets are perceived as ideologically-relevant, they may 
be viewed as justifying ideology to the same extent as hope and fear with politically-relevant 
targets. The motivation to experience hope and fear should then be the same regardless of 
whether the emotions’ targets are politically-relevant or irrelevant. Therefore, findings similar 
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to those of Pliskin et al. (in preparation) are expected to be obtained in the present study for 
hope and fear with either politically-relevant or irrelevant targets. 
The Present Study 
 The present study examines whether people believe that hope or fear justifies their 
ideologies and are thus motivated to experience this emotion, even when the emotion’s target 
is politically-irrelevant. Based on earlier reasoning, the first hypothesis is that leftists 
(compared to rightists) have a stronger belief that hope justifies their ideology and are thus 
more motivated to experience hope, regardless of whether the emotion’s target is politically-
relevant or irrelevant. The second hypothesis is that rightists (compared to leftists) have a 
stronger belief that fear justifies their ideology and are thus more motivated to experience 
fear, regardless of whether the emotion’s target is politically-relevant or irrelevant. These 
hypotheses will be tested by measuring participants’ beliefs about (and desire to experience) 
hope and fear regarding politically-relevant versus irrelevant events. Furthermore, the present 
study takes place in the Netherlands and is conducted in Dutch, with data collection occurring 
on two separate occasions per participant.  
Method 
Participants 
 Dutch-speaking residents of the Netherlands were recruited for the present study 
through SONA (Leiden University Research Participation), through social networks, and 
through face-to-face contact in and around the Leiden University Faculty of Social and 
Behavioural Sciences. Participants could receive one study credit or €3,50 (consistent with 
the standard hourly rate) for completing the experiment. At times, recruitment was 
intentionally biased in favour of rightist participants in order to obtain an ideologically-
balanced sample. In this case, leftist participants who had filled out the first (but not the 
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second) questionnaire were not allowed to complete the experiment. In total, 237 participants 
(133 women and 104 men) aged eighteen to seventy-eight (M = 29.07, SD = 13.42) were 
recruited, with age information missing for four participants. Of the 237 participants, forty-
four completed only the first questionnaire and were therefore excluded from analyses. 
Another nine participants were excluded after being suspected of inattentively filling out the 
second questionnaire. More specifically, these participants filled out the second questionnaire 
in less than five minutes, whereas the obtained data as well as personal experience suggest it 
takes approximately fifteen minutes to do so attentively. Finally, 184 participants (107 
women and seventy-seven men), aged eighteen to seventy-eight (M = 28.92, SD = 13.20), 
were included in analyses. In terms of political ideology, seventy-one participants were 
slightly to extremely leftist, fifty-eight were centrist, and fifty-five were slightly to extremely 
rightist.  
 Of the 184 participants, forty-five completed the second questionnaire less than three 
hours after completing the first one. Due to this relatively short interval, these participants’ 
responses to the first questionnaire may have influenced their responses to the second one 
(e.g., by alerting them to the true purpose of the second questionnaire’s measures). To 
investigate this possibility, all analyses were repeated once without these forty-five 
participants. 
Procedure 
 The present study was conducted after being approved by the ethics committee, using 
research materials which had been translated into Dutch. Data were collected through 
Qualtrics, a computer program for data collection and analysis. Once individuals had 
scheduled their participation in SONA or through personal contact with the researchers, they 
were emailed a first, short questionnaire. This questionnaire contained study information and 
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informed consent forms, in addition to questions regarding demographics. On the scheduled 
date and time, participants arrived in the lab or completed a second, longer questionnaire 
online. The second questionnaire affirmed participants’ informed consent before explaining 
that they would be asked shortly to write a brief text about their values. The thought of 
having to write this text was meant to elicit a desire to experience ideology-justifying 
emotions (i.e., hope or fear). Participants were additionally told that before writing the text 
(and after answering some additional questions), they would be given the opportunity to read 
a number of unrelated articles, as research had shown that reading about unrelated subjects 
improved one’s writing skills.   
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions, with 
one condition containing six politically-relevant article headlines and the other containing six 
politically-irrelevant headlines (between-subjects). Furthermore, each participant viewed 
three headlines hinting at hope and three hinting at fear. These headlines had been pre-tested 
to ensure that people expected the corresponding articles to induce either hope or fear. 
Participants were allowed to rank the headlines in the order of their desire to read the 
corresponding articles, as there would ostensibly be insufficient time to read all of them. 
After ranking headlines, participants answered some questions related to measures that were 
included for exploratory purposes (i.e., promotion versus prevention focus, trait anxiety, 
intolerance of uncertainty, optimism versus pessimism, adult trait hope, evaluations of hope 
and fear, and ideology justification beliefs regarding hope and fear). Finally, participants were 
fully debriefed and told that they were not actually required to read articles or write a short 
text, as these tasks were not the true aim of the present study. 
Measures 
 Demographics. A separate questionnaire was created for the measurement of 
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demographic variables. This questionnaire measured participants’ age, education level 
(options ranged from high school to University Master’s degree or higher), the extent to 
which their political opinions were leftist versus rightist (options ranged from 1 = Extremely 
leftist, to 4 = Centrist, to 7 = Extremely rightist) and social versus liberal (options ranged 
from 1 = Very social, to 4 = Neither social nor liberal, to 7 = Very liberal), and their political 
progressiveness versus conservativeness (options ranged from 1 = Very progressive, to 4 = 
Neither progressive nor conservative, to 7 = Very conservative). It additionally measured 
participants’ level of religiosity (options ranged from 1 = Atheist, to 2 = Not religious, to 5 = 
Very religious) and their monthly household income compared to the Dutch average of 
€4,100 (options ranged from 1 = Much lower than average to 5 = Much higher than 
average). Participants’ gender was accidentally omitted from this questionnaire and was 
instead measured separately after the experiment. 
 Motivation to experience hope versus fear. The present study employed 
experimental stimuli in the form of fabricated article headlines referring to (fictional) current 
events in the Netherlands. Participants’ rankings of these headlines (rank 1 being the highest 
and rank 6 the lowest) were used as indications of their motivation to experience the 
emotions (i.e., hope or fear) hinted at by the headlines. In other words, a higher ranking 
indicated a stronger preference for an article and thus for the emotion hinted at by the article’s 
headline. For analysis purposes, headline rankings were first reverse-scored (so that higher 
numbers indicated higher rankings), and separate mean scores for hope and fear preferences 
were then calculated using the corresponding headlines’ rankings.                                                       
 Trait anxiety. To measure trait anxiety, the Anxiety subscale of the Trait version of 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Roberts, 2013) was employed. This subscale 
consisted of six items with a Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 
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(almost always), with higher scores indicating more trait anxiety. For analysis purposes, a 
mean score of trait anxiety was calculated using all six items (α = .87). 
 Promotion versus prevention focus. To measure promotion (versus prevention) 
focus, the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001) was used. The RFQ 
consisted of eleven items, with the promotion focus subscale containing six items (α = .67) 
and the prevention focus subscale containing five items (α = .67). Eight items had a response 
scale ranging from 1 (never or seldom), to 3 (sometimes), to 5 (very often). One item had a 
response scale ranging from 1 (never true), to 3 (sometimes true), to 5 (very often true). 
Lastly, two items had a response scale ranging from 1 (certainly false) to 5 (certainly true). 
Mean scores of promotion and prevention focus were calculated using the corresponding 
items (some of which had to be reverse-scored). 
 Intolerance of uncertainty. To measure intolerance of uncertainty, a brief version of 
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Fialko, Bolton, & Perrin, 2012) was employed. 
This scale contained 5 items with a response scale ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of 
me) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me), with higher scores indicating less tolerance of 
uncertainty (Fialko et al., 2012). A mean score of intolerance of uncertainty was calculated 
using all five items (α = .85).   
 Optimism versus pessimism. To measure optimism (versus pessimism), the revised 
Life Orientation Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) was used. This test consisted of ten 
items, with the optimism (α = .63) and pessimism (α = .65) subscales containing three items 
each and the remaining items being fillers. All items had response scales ranging from 0 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Mean scores of optimism and pessimism were 
calculated using the corresponding items. 
 Adult trait hope. To measure adult trait hope, a questionnaire by Snyder (2000) was 
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employed. This questionnaire consisted of twelve items with response scales ranging from 1 
(definitely false) to 8 (definitely true). A mean score of adult trait hope was calculated using 
all twelve items (α = .82), some of which had to be reverse-scored.  
 Evaluations of hope and fear. To measure participants’ evaluations of politically-
relevant or irrelevant hope and fear, the Evaluations of Emotions scales (EVE; Netzer, Kim, 
& Tamir, in preparation) were used. These scales required participants to evaluate hope and 
fear (in general and in relation to potential political developments) by selecting one of seven 
points on a continuum located between two labels. The pairs of labels were bad versus good, 
harmful versus useful, foolish versus wise, worthless versus valuable, and unnecessary versus 
necessary (Netzer et al., in preparation). For each of the four EVE scales, a mean score was 
calculated using the corresponding items (with reliabilities ranging from α = .85 to α = .92). 
However, these mean scores were not included as control variables as they were considered 
too conceptually similar to mean preference for hope- (or fear-)inducing articles and ideology 
justification beliefs regarding hope and fear.  
 Ideology justification beliefs. To measure the degree to which participants believed 
that hope and fear justified their ideologies, a questionnaire adapted from Pliskin et al. (in 
preparation) was employed (see full questionnaire in Appendix A). This questionnaire 
contained eight items, four measuring beliefs about hope (α = .86) and four measuring beliefs 
about fear (α = .86), with response scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 
(completely agree). Mean scores of ideology justification beliefs about hope and fear were 
calculated using the corresponding items. 
Results  
Effects of Ideology and Condition on Preference for Hope versus Fear 
 The mean ranking assigned to each type of article headline across participants is 
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displayed in Figure 1 (based on eighty-three participants viewing politically-relevant 
headlines and 101 viewing politically-irrelevant headlines). For the purpose of analysis, 
political ideology was transformed into a nominal variable containing three levels (leftist, 
centrist, and rightist). The results discussed below were obtained using the main sample (N = 
184) and were not substantially affected by the exclusion of the forty-five participants who 
completed the second questionnaire less than three hours after completing the first one. 
 The hypothesis that leftists (compared to rightists) more strongly believe that general 
hope justifies their ideology and are thus more motivated to experience this emotion, as well 
as the hypothesis that rightists (compared to leftists) more strongly believe that general fear 
justifies their ideology and are thus more motivated to experience this emotion, was tested by 
performing a number of univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA). For the first ANOVA, 
participants’ ideology (leftist, centrist, or rightist) and experimental condition (politically-
relevant versus irrelevant article headlines) were used as independent variables and mean 
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Hope/Political Fear/Political Hope/Nonpolitical Fear/Nonpolitical
Figure 1. Mean rankings of headline types across participants. Higher rankings indicate stronger 
preference, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 6.
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preference for hope-inducing articles per participant was used as the dependent variable. The 
main effect of ideology was significant, F(2, 178) = 5.099, p = .007. Pairwise comparisons 
(with Bonferroni correction) indicated that leftists (M = 3.96) had a significantly stronger 
preference for hope-inducing articles than did rightists (M = 3.53), whereas neither group 
differed significantly from centrists (M = 3.72). The main effect of condition was 
nonsignificant, F(1, 178) = .453, p = .502, as was the interaction effect of ideology and 
condition, F(2, 178) = .022, p = .978.  
 When the aforementioned ANOVA was performed with mean preference for fear-
inducing articles per participant as the dependent variable instead, similar results were 
obtained. This is because participants’ preferences for hope- and fear-inducing articles are 
located on the same spectrum and thus complement one another. Pairwise comparisons (with 
Bonferroni correction) for fear preference thus displayed a pattern complementing that of the 
pairwise comparisons for hope preference; rightists (M = 3.47) had a significantly stronger 
preference for fear-inducing articles than did leftists (M = 3.04), whereas neither group 
differed significantly from centrists (M = 3.28). 
Influence of Control Variables                                                                                     
 Although all potential control variables except gender correlated weakly with mean 
preference for hope- (or fear-)inducing articles (see Table B1), five were included in order to 
investigate their combined influence on the first ANOVA’s results. Gender, education level 
and religiosity were controlled for because these were the three demographic measures 
correlating most strongly with mean preference for hope- (or fear-)inducing articles (see 
Table B1). In addition, promotion and prevention focus were controlled for due to their 
conceptual relations to hope and fear preferences, respectively. After inclusion of the five 
control variables, the main effect of ideology became nonsignificant, F(2, 173) = 1.760, p = .
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175. The main effect of condition remained nonsignificant, F(1, 173) = .861, p = .355, as did 
the interaction effect of ideology and condition, F(2, 173) = .081, p = .922. A closer 
examination revealed that the main effect of ideology became nonsignificant due to the 
inclusion of gender (p = .003) as a control variable. After this control variable was excluded 
(while the other four were included), the main effect of ideology became significant, F(2, 
174) = 4.907, p = .008, with pairwise comparisons displaying the same pattern as before the 
inclusion of control variables.  
 Pairwise comparisons for gender (when including all five control variables) indicated 
that female participants (M = 3.90) had a significantly stronger preference for hope-inducing 
articles than did male participants (M = 3.52). When mean preference for fear-inducing 
articles was used as the dependent variable instead, pairwise comparisons for gender showed 
a complementary pattern; male participants (M = 3.48) had a significantly stronger preference 
for fear-inducing articles than did female participants (M = 3.10). 
Mediation Through Ideology Justification Beliefs 
 As the correlations between ideology justification beliefs (about hope and fear) and 
mean preference for hope- (or fear-)inducing articles were nonsignificant and weak (see Table 
B1), there was no potential for mediation through justification beliefs. Thus, no mediation 
analyses were performed.  
Discussion 
Hypotheses and Findings 
 The present study investigates whether findings similar to those of Pliskin et al. (in 
preparation) can be obtained using politically-relevant as well as irrelevant targets of hope 
and fear. To this end, two related hypotheses are tested; that leftists (compared to rightists) 
more strongly believe that general hope justifies their ideology and are thus more motivated 
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to experience hope, and that rightists (compared to leftists) more strongly believe that general 
fear justifies their ideology and are thus more motivated to experience fear.  
 Consistent with the hypotheses, leftists were more motivated than rightists to 
experience hope, whereas rightists were more motivated than leftists to experience fear. As 
additionally hypothesised, the motivation to experience hope or fear was unaffected by the 
political relevance of the emotions’ targets, nor did political relevance interact with political 
ideology to influence this motivation. Contrary to expectations, the influence of ideology on 
the motivation to experience hope or fear was not mediated by the belief that hope or fear 
justified one’s ideology.  
 The absence of mediation through beliefs about hope and fear may stem from the use 
of a questionnaire adapted from Pliskin et al. (in preparation), which may have been less 
successful than the original in measuring such beliefs. Alternatively, participants may have 
lacked a convincing reason to attach any significance to their own beliefs about hope and fear 
(in relation to ideology) due to the artificiality of the experimental context, which may 
explain why these beliefs failed to act as mediators. This would also explain why Pliskin et 
al. (in preparation), who conducted their study in relation to actual, politically-relevant events 
(e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), did find beliefs about hope and fear to mediate the 
influence of ideology on the desire to experience hope or fear. 
The Role of Gender 
 After the influence of participants’ gender on their motivation to experience hope or 
fear was controlled for, the effect of ideology on this motivation became nonsignificant. 
Women were found to be more motivated than men to experience hope, whereas men were 
more motivated than women to experience fear. This pattern is similar to that observed for 
leftists versus rightists, which may be because most leftists (i.e., 73.2 percent) were female 
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and most rightists (i.e., 72.7 percent) were male. Norrander and Wilcox (2008) have found 
that in recent times, American men and women have generally become more conservative, 
while some women have instead remained liberal. As liberalism and conservatism strongly 
relate to leftism and rightism, respectively, these findings may at least partially explain the 
observed overlap between the effects of ideology and gender in the present study. However, 
whereas Norrander and Wilcox (2008) employed an American sample, the present sample 
contained Dutch participants. As Dutch society is known to be more politically moderate as 
well as more leftist compared to American society, the present overlap between ideology and 
gender may also stem partially from the use of an entirely Dutch sample.  
 Although no previous studies appear to explain the aforementioned influence of 
gender on preferences for hope versus fear, the present results (when including gender) do 
suggest that women (instead of leftists) are more motivated to experience hope, whereas men 
(instead of rightists) are more motivated to experience fear.    
Previous Findings 
 Although the present findings indicated that preferences for hope and fear were 
unaffected by the political relevance of the emotions’ targets, the opposite might have been 
expected based on the study by Hillebrandt and Barclay (2017). These researchers found that 
the degree to which observers attributed the emotions of negotiation counterparts to their own 
behaviour depended on whether the emotions were integral (i.e., related to their targets) or 
incidental (i.e., unrelated to their targets). Based on these findings, one might expect the 
political relevance of emotion targets in the present study to somehow affect emotion 
preferences. However, Hillebrandt and Barclay (2017) studied attributions for others’ 
emotions, whereas the present study focused on participants’ beliefs about their emotional 
experiences in relation to ideology. These differences limit the comparability of Hillebrandt 
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and Barclay’s (2017) findings to those obtained in the present study. 
Potential Limitations and Future Directions 
 A potential limitation of the present study is that the employed sample contained 
relatively large numbers of leftist (versus rightist) and female (versus male) participants, 
which explains the overall higher mean rankings for article headlines hinting at hope 
compared to headlines hinting at fear (see Figure 1). Another potential limitation of the 
present study is that no measures were included to test the effectiveness of the cover story 
presented to participants regarding the task of writing about personal values. This allows for 
the possibility that participants were motivated to experience hope or fear by something other 
than the need to justify their ideologies. In addition, the degree to which the modified 
questionnaire on ideology justification beliefs accurately measured the intended construct 
was not investigated. 
 Future studies employing manipulations or questionnaires similar to those used 
presently should evaluate the effectiveness of these measures. Furthermore, future research 
involving ideology and motivated emotion regulation should be designed to elucidate the 
separate effects of ideology and gender on the motivation to experience (ideology-justifying) 
hope or fear. Finally, future studies should investigate whether the findings of Pliskin et al. (in 
preparation) also apply to hope and fear with politically-irrelevant targets. 
Conclusion 
 In general, the obtained findings fail to support the present hypotheses. This is 
primarily due to the unexpected influence of gender on hope and fear preferences, as well as 
an absence of mediation through beliefs about these emotions. It thus remains unclear 
whether people believe hope and fear justify their ideologies and therefore want to experience 
these emotions, even when the emotions’ targets are politically-irrelevant.  
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire on Ideology Justification Beliefs Regarding Hope and Fear 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by 
selecting a number (1 to 6) on the response scale. 
1. In general, experiencing hope justifies my political beliefs 
2. In general, experiencing fear justifies my political beliefs 
3. Experiencing hope in general reinforces my political beliefs 
4. Experiencing fear in general reinforces my political beliefs 
5. Reading hopeful articles reinforces my political beliefs 
6. Reading fearful articles reinforces my political beliefs 
7. Feeling hopeful about potential political developments reinforces my political beliefs 
8. Reading fearful articles about potential political developments reinforces my political 
beliefs
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Appendix B 
Correlation Table 
Table B1  
Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level  ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Mean hope preference 3.75 0.77 -
2 Gender 1.58 0.50 .29** -
3 Age 28.92 13.20 -.06 -.17* -
4 Education level 3.24 1.13 .09 -.04 -.27** -
5 Religiosity 2.16 1.00 -.08 .13 .07 -.11 -
6 Household income 2.52 1.26 -.05 .00 .19* -.17* .07 -
7 Promotion focus 3.73 0.58 -.06 -.15* .02 .15* -.01 .13 -
8 Prevention focus 3.63 0.75 .09 .17* .03 -.06 .07 .09 -.02 -
9 Trait anxiety 1.92 0.68 .03 .26** -.23** .09 .04 -.14 -.46** .00 -
10 Intolerance of 
uncertainty
2.08 0.81 .02 .20** -.07 .00 .18* .04 -.33** .09 .57** -
11 Optimism 3.49 0.69 -.08 -.35** .12 .06 -.07 .10 .45** -.13 -.54** -.36** -
12 Pessimism 2.48 0.71 -.09 .26** -.17* -.04 -.03 -.12 -.40** -.02 .47** .38** -.47** -
13 Adult trait hope 5.63 0.91 -.05 -.35** .09 .15* -.08 .10 .67** -.15* -.64** -.48** .61** -.51** -
14 Ideology justification 
beliefs for fear
2.92 1.00 .00 .19** -.10 -.07 .00 -.07 .08 -.01 .11 .16* .00 .20** -.12 -
15 Ideology justification 
beliefs for hope 
3.59 0.95 .02 .08 -.01 .00 .10 .07 .15* .22** .05 .17* .09 -.10 .01 .26** -
